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Case No. 20020703-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
jurisdiction is crimen eu upon i in linn liiipieme i mm piusuani in ihr pun is mi is 
iif I It,ill ( 'oilc AnnoCilul ft 7S "» ?n»(a) 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REV ILW 
W:.e.; . j : Annotai 
because it prohibits "iere possession of a firearm? Constitutional challenges to statutes 
are questions of law reviewed by this court for correctness. State " . 2000 TT ' » 
358, f 3, 18 P.3d 500. This issue was preserved in a motion to dis;;.:.Ns . n 
191). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and 
defense of self, family, and others, property, or the state, as well as for other 
lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the 
legislature from defining the lawful use of arms. 
Article I, § 26 of the Utah Constitution 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless 
by express words they are declared to be otherwise. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a) 
[a] Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses 
or has under his custody or control: (a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree 
felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Wade Willis appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Honorable Gary D. Stott, Fourth District Court, after the entry of a conditional plea to 
the charge of possession of a firearm by a restricted person, a second degree felony, 
2 
and the Court of Appeals affirmation of his conviction. State v. Willis, 2002 UT App 
229, 451 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 52 P.3d 461. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Wade Willis was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on 
August 15, 2000, with possession of a firearm by a restricted person, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a), and theft, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-6-404, 412 (R. 2). 
On October 4, 2000, a preliminary hearing was held at which time Willis was 
bound over for trial on the charges upon a finding of probable cause; and pleas of "not 
guilty" were entered upon arraignment (R. 18, 191 at 26). 
On October 11, 2000, Willis filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence on grounds 
that the probation search of his residence constituted an illegal warrantless search under 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (R. 23-29). After a hearing on 
January 2, 2001, Judge Gary D. Stott denied the motion (R. 42-43, 192). 
On January 4, 2001, Willis filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-10-503 (2) (a) is unconstitutional on its face and in violation of the right 
to keep and bear arms set forth in Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution (R. 45-124). 
On February 6, 2001, Judge Stott denied the motion (R. 142-43). 
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On March 23, 2001, Willis entered a plea of "guilty" to possession of a firearm 
by a restricted person, a second degree felony, conditioned upon his right to appeal the 
denial of his motion to suppress and motion to dismiss (R. 164-71, 172-74, 177). 
On May 11, 2001, Willis was sentenced to 180-days in the Utah County Jail, 
ordered to pay a fine, and placed on supervised probation for a period of thirty-six 
months (R. 180-82). 
On June 8, 2001, Willis filed a Notice of Appeal in Fourth District Court (R. 
184). On July 5, 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed Willis' conviction. State v. 
Wilis, 2002 UT App 229, 451 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 52 P.3d 461. 
On September 2, 2002, Willis filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah 
Court of Appeals that was granted by this Court. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Jonathan Coones testified that he is the owner of a 9-milimeter handgun (R. 191 
at 5). Coones testified that in August of 2000 the gun was kept on the top shelf of a 
closet in his motor home which was located in his backyard in Spanish Fork (R. 191at 
5, 7, 10). Coones testified that he knows Willis and that Willis was given permission 
to enter the motor home by Coones' mother (R. 191 at 5-6). Sometime later, Coones 
discovered that his gun was missing (R. 191 at 6). Coones asked Willis about the gun 
but Willis denied taking it (R. 191 at 7). At the time, the gun turned up missing the 
4 
lock on the motor home door did not work and a few other people had access to the 
motor home (R. 191 at 8). 
Eric Price, an employee of Adult Probation & Parole, testified that he is Willis' 
probation officer and that in August of 2000 Willis was on felony probation for evading 
a police officer, a third degree felony (R. 191 at 15). Price testified that he received a 
call from Detective Mitchell and was informed that Willis was a suspect of a theft of a 
firearm from Coones (R. 191 at 17-18). On August 1, 2000, Price-based on the 
information he received from Mitchell-searched Willis' home located at 1516 South 
320 East in Orem; and was present when a 9-millimeter firearm was found in Willis' 
bedroom closet (R. 191 at 15-16, 18). 
Brad Mitchell, a detective with the Spanish Fork Police Department, testified 
that he investigated a complaint from Coones concerning the missing handgun (R. 191 
at 20-21). Mitchell contacted Adult Probation & Parole and directed them to Willis' 
home (R. 191 at 21). The serial number provided by Coones was the same serial 
number that was on the gun found at Willis' residence (R. 191 at 21). Mitchell later 
interviewed Willis and was told that "the handgun was given from Mr. Coones to his 
mother and that his mother had asked him to store the gun in his bedroom for his 
mother" (R. 191 at 22). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Willis asserts that the plain language of Article I, § 6, as it was amended in 
1984, provides that an individual's right to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, 
and that it grants to the legislature only the power to define the lawful use of arms. 
Accordingly, Willis asserts that Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a) is 
unconstitutional on its face because it infringes on the right of individuals—including 
Willis-to merely "possess" or have "under [their] custody or control" any firearm and 
subjects them to felony prosecution and possible incarceration. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION THAT UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED §76-10-503(2)(a) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE PLAIN 
LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE I, §6 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
IS ERRONEOUS. 
Willis asserts that the plain language of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503 (2) (a) 
violates his individual right to bear and keep arms set forth in the plain language of 
Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution because it makes mere possession of a firearm by 
a restricted person a crime. Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a) essentially reads 
that any category I restricted person who "purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has 
under his custody or control: any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony" 
(emphasis added). The trial court denied Willis' motion on grounds that this Court in 
State v. In, 2000 UT App 358, 18 P.3d 500, had ruled that this statute "does not 
unconstitutionally interfere with one's right to bear arms" and that the statute "only 
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restricts [the right to bear arms] under very limited circumstances-such as a felony 
indictment or conviction'' (R. 142) (quoting In, 2000 UT 358 at f 14). The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court based on its prior decision in In and also 
because the court found no distinction between the terms "use" and "possess". 
Willis asserts that the Court of Appeals' reliance on State v. In is erroneous. 
First, the Court of Appeals in In specifically did not address the issue of whether the 
statute as it relates to mere possession of a firearm is constitutional on its face. In, 
2000 UT App 358 at \ 3, n.2. Similarly, the Court of Appeals in State v. Archambeau, 
820 P.2d 920, 926 (Utah App. 1991), refused to reach the merits of a similar 
constitutional challenge as to possession of a weapon by a parolee because the issue was 
not raised in the trial court and did not rise to the level of plain error. Accordingly, 
contrary to the trial court's ruling, neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals had ever 
addressed the issue of whether Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503 (2) (a) as it relates to 
mere possession of a firearm is unconstitutional on its face in regards to the current 
plain language of Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution. 
Second, in In, the defendant actually used a firearm rather than merely 
possessing it. 2000 UT App 358 at f 2. The legislature's ability to regulate the use of 
arms is not impeded by the plain language of Article I, § 6. Accordingly, the Appeals' 
Court statement in In, 2000 UT App 358 at 1f 14, that Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-
503(2)(a) "does not unconstitutionally interfere with one's right to bear arms" because 
it "only restricts that right under very limited circumstances - such as felony or 
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indictment or conviction" is correct as it relates to use of a weapon by a restricted 
person - which is the factual scenario that was presented in In. See also Willis, 2002 
U T A p p 2 2 9 a t t 3 . 
However, Willis asserts that the Court of Appeals' distinction between the terms 
"use" and "possess" in the plain language of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a) is 
erroneous. When examining statutory language, appellate courts are to "assume the 
legislature used each term advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary meaning." 
State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, f 10, 44 P.3d 680 (citing Nelson v. Salt Lake 
County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995)). Furthermore, appellate courts should "avoid 
interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative." Hall v. 
State Dep't ofCorr., 2001 UT 34, 1 15, 24 P.3d 958. See also State v. McKinnon, 
2002 UT App 214, 51 P.3d 729 n.4. 
The legislature saw fit to include both "use" and "possess" in § 76-10-503(2)(a). 
The terms "use" and "possess" have different ordinary meanings. Accordingly, the 
Court of Appeals erred in finding no distinction between the terms. Moreover, in 
failing to define the terms according to their ordinary meaning, the Court of Appeals 
has effectively rendered the term "possess" superfluous and inoperative. 
Third, pre-1984 case law is not on point and is not dispositive on this issue. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals' reliance on pre-1984 case law such as State v. Beorchia, 
530 P.2d 813 (Utah 1974), is misplaced. 
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Prior to January 1, 1985, Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution read: "The 
people have the right to bear arms for their security and defense, but the Legislature 
may regulate the exercise of this right by law." State v. Vlacil, 645 P.2d 677, 680 
(Utah 1982). Based upon this language this Court in State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813, 
814 (Utah 1974), held that a statute which made it a class A misdemeanor for non-
citizens to possess any dangerous weapon did not violate Article I, § 6 because it "is 
quite evident from the language [of the amendment] that the Legislature had sufficient 
power to enact the statute in question." This Court in Beorchia also held that the 
statute did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution because "[t]he sale, use and possession of firearms are 
proper subjects of regulation by the State" and "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment is not 
generally applied so as to restrict exercise of the police powers of the State." 
A few years later this Court addressed the constitutionality of this same statute 
under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. See State v. Vlacil, 645 
P.2d 677 (Utah 1982). This Court concluded "the right to bear arms under the federal 
constitution is collective rather than individual." 645 P.2d at 679. Based upon this 
conclusion, this Court held that "an individual's right to bear arms is subject to the 
police power of the various states." 645 P.2d at 679. Accordingly, the statute that 
made it a crime for non-citizens to possess a dangerous weapon was not prohibited by 
the Second Amendment either. 
After the decisions in Beorchia and Vlacil, the Utah Legislature changed the 
language of Article I, § 6 in order to secure greater individual rights. See M. Truman 
Hunt, The Individual Right to Bear Arms: An Illusory Pacifier?, 4 Utah L.Rev. 751, 
751-755 (1986). This constitutional amendment was approved by the electorate in 
November of 1984, and took effect on January 1, 1985. Article I, § 6 of the Utah 
Constitution now reads: 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and defense 
of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful 
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature 
from defining the lawful use of arms. 
Willis asserts that this amendment clarifies that the right to bear and possess 
arms under the state constitution is an individual right rather than a collective one. 
Further, the language of this current constitutional provision was specifically designed 
to guarantee "broad individual liberties and protect[] the enjoyment of those liberties 
from infringement." 4 Utah L.Rev. at 752 n.8, (citing Utah Voter Information 
Pamphlet, 28 (1984)). 
In addition, whereas prior to the 1984 amendment, the Legislature had the ability 
to "regulate the exercise" of the right to bear arms by law, now the Legislature only 
has the ability to "defin[e] the lawful use of arms" (emphasis added). Therefore, Willis 
asserts that the plain language of Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution prevents the 
legislature from limiting or restricting an individual's right to possess and keep 
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firearms. Moreover, "In considering the meaning of a constitutional provision, a court 
must begin its analysis with the plain language of the provision and need not look 
beyond the plain language unless some ambiguity is found." Utah School Boards Ass'n 
v. Utah State Bd. Of Education, 2001 UT 2, % 13, 17 P.3d 1125 (quoting In re 
Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah 1996)). 
Because the plain language of Article I, § 6 provides that an individual's right to 
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, and because the plain language also grants to 
the legislature only the power to define the lawful use of arms, Willis asserts that Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-10-503 (2) (a) is unconstitutional on its face because it violates the 
plain language of Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution and infringes on the right of 
individuals-including Willis-to merely "possess" or have "under [their] custody or 
control" any firearm and subjects them to felony prosecution and possible 
incarceration. Moreover, Article I, § 26 of the Utah Constitution states, "The 
provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words 
they are declared to be otherwise." 
Furthermore, legislative history of Article I, §6 (1985) is not helpful. It appears 
that when the amendment process began, the legislators desired to insure a state 
individual right to keep and bear arms (Utah H., Debate on Sen. Jt. Res. No. 2, 1-3 on 
the Floor of the House, (Mar. 7, 1983)). The voter information pamphlet for 
November 6, 1984 indicates in the "Arguments For" section that "convicted felons, 
mental incompetents, minors, and illegal aliens would not be guaranteed" the right to 
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keep and bear arms. Voter Information Pamphlet page 28. In the "Rebuttal To" 
section, the author warns that the language of the amendment itself makes no mention 
of classes of people who are not protected by the amendment. Id. It also appears that 
the amendment was not studied by the Judiciary Interim Study Committee or by the 
Constitutional Study and Revision Commission. Id. at 4-5, 9-10; (minutes of the 
Constitutional Revision Committee, 5/25/84 page 2) (R. 118-24, 123). 
Willis asserts that while this Court may deem the constitutional amendment of 
Article I, § 6 unwise, judicial compensation is not the answer. If the legislature wants 
to penalize offenders for possessing weapons, the legislature needs to propose an 
amendment to the constitution and submit it to the electorate. 
If this Court were to save the statute penalizing mere possession of weapons by 
offenders by finding that, in defining lawful use of arms under Article I, § 6, the 
legislature may proscribe mere possession, the constitutional right to keep and bear 
arms would be an empty shell for all of us. Moreover, Willis asserts that Article I, § 
26 of the Utah Constitution requires this Court to give effect to the plain language of 
Article I, § 6. Accordingly, Willis asks that this Court reverse the decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Willis asks this Court to reverse the Court of 
Appeals' decision on the ground that the statute which makes it unlawful for a restricted 
person to merely possess a firearm violates his individual right to keep arms as 
guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. Willis further asks that this matter be remanded 
to the Fourth District with instructions that his plea is to be withdrawn, and the matter 
dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of May, 2003. 
Margaret. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 
South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 14th day of 
May, 2003. 
Margaret J^ Liifclsay 




76-10-503 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
37« 
(3) A muzzle loading firearm shall be deemed to be loaded 
when it is capped or primed and has a powder charge and ball 
or shot in the barrel or cylinders. 1990 
76-10-503. Restrict ions on possess ion, purchase , trans-
fer, and ownership of dangerous weapons by 
certain persons. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) A Category I restricted person is a person who: 
(i) has been convicted of any violent felony as 
defined in Section 76-3-203.5; 
(ii) is on probation or parole for any felony; 
(iii) is on parole from a secure facility as defined in 
Section 62A-7-101; or 
(iv) within the last ten years has been adjudicated 
delinquent for an offense which if committed by an 
adult would have been a violent felony as defined in 
Section 76-3-203.5. 
(b) A Category II restricted person is a person who: 
(i) has been convicted of or is under indictment for 
any felony; 
(ii) within the last seven years has been adjudi-
cated delinquent for an offense which if committed by 
an adult would have been a felony; 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance 
as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(iv) is in possession of a dangerous weapon and is 
knowingly and intentionally in unlawful possession 
of a Schedule I controlled substance as defined in 
Section 58-37-2; 
(v) has been found not guilty by reason of insanity 
for a felony offense; 
(vi) has been found mentally incompetent to stand 
trial for a felony offense; 
(vii) has been adjudicated as mentally defective as 
provided in the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention 
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159,107 Stat. 1536 (1993), or has 
been committed to a mental institution; 
(viii) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in 
the United States; 
(ix) has been dishonorably discharged from the 
armed forces; or 
(x) has renounced his citizenship after having been 
a citizen of the United States. 
(2) A Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers, 
possesses, uses, or has under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(3) A Category II restricted person who purchases, trans-
fers, possesses, uses, or has under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(4) A person may be subject to the restrictions of both 
ategories at the same time. 
(5) If a higher penalty than is prescribed in this section is 
rovided in another section for one who purchases, transfers, 
ossesses, uses, or has under this custody or control any 
angerous weapon, the penalties of that section control. 2000 
6-10-504. Carrying concealed dangerous weapon — 
Penalt ies . 
(1) Except as provided in Section 76-10-503 and in Subsec-
ons (2) and (3): 
(a) a person who carries a concealed dangerous 
weapon, as defined in Section 76-10-501, which is not a 
firearm on his person or one that is readily accessible for 
immediate use which is not securely encased, as defined 
in this part, in a place other than his residence, property, 
or business under his control is guilty of 
misdemeanor; and a c*a*s B 
(b) a person without a valid concealed firearm 
who carries a concealed dangerous weapon wh' vf1^ 
firearm and tha t contains no ammunition is gujif ** * 
class B misdemeanor, but if the firearm contains ^ 
nition the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor^ 
(2) A person who carries concealed a sawed-off shot?i 
sawed-off rifle is guilty of a second degree felony. ^ m ° r t 
(3) If the concealed firearm is used in the commission f 
violent felony as defined in Section 76-3-203.5, and the DP 
is a party to the offense, the person is guilty of a second dee*** 
felony. ^ 
(4) Nothing in Subsection (1) shall prohibit a person en-
gaged in the lawful taking of protected or unprotected wildlife 
as defined in Title 23, Wildlife Resources Code, from carrying 
a concealed weapon or a concealed firearm with a barrel 
length of four inches or greater as long as the taking of wildlife 
does not occur: 
(a) within the limits of a municipality in violation of 
that municipality's ordinances; or 
(b) upon the highways of the state as defined in Section 
41-6-1. 2000 
76-10-505. Carrying loaded firearm in vehicle, on 
street, or in prohibited area. 
(1) Unless otherwise authorized by law, a person may not 
carry a loaded firearm: 
(a) in or on a vehicle; 
(b) on any public street; or 
(c) in a posted prohibited area. 
(2) A violation of this section is a class B misdemeanor. 
1990 
76-10-505.5. Possess ion of a dangerous weapon, fire-
arm, or sawed-off shotgun on or about school 
premises — Penal t ies . 
(1) A person may not possess any dangerous weapon, fire-
arm, or sawed-off shotgun, as those terms are defined in 
Section 76-10-501, at a place that the person knows, or has 
reasonable cause to believe, is on or about school premises. 
(2) (a) Possession of a dangerous weapon on or about school 
premises is a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) Possession of a firearm or sawed-off shotgun on or 
about school premises is a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) This section applies to any person, except persons au-
thorized to possess a firearm as provided under Sections 
53-5-704, 53-5-705, 53A-3-502, 76-10-511, 76-10-523, Subsec-
tion 76-10-504(2), and as otherwise authorized by law. 
(4) This section does not prohibit prosecution of a more 
serious weapons offense that may occur on or about school 
premises. 1997 
76-10-506. Threatening wi th or us ing dangerous 
w e a p o n in fight or quarrel. 
Every person, except those persons described in Section 
76-10-503, who, not in necessary self defense in the presence 
of two or more persons, draws or exhibits any dangerous 
weapon in an angry and threatening manner or unlawfully 
uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 1 9 9 2 
76-10-507. Possess ion of deadly w e a p o n wi th intent to 
assault. 
Every person having upon his person any dangerous 
weapon with intent to unlawfully assault another is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor. 1973 
76-10-508. Discharge of firearm from a vehic le , near a 
highway, or in direct ion of any person, build-
ing, or vehic le — Penalt ies . 
(1) (a) A person may not discharge any kind of dangerous 
weapon or firearm: 
JARED W. ELDRIDGE (8176) 
Attorney for Defendant 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOC 
245 North University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: 379-2570 
rN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PROVO DEPARTMENT, IN 
AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 




I. THE STATUTE PROHIBITING PEOPLE ON PROBATION OR PAROLE FOR 
ANY FELONY FROM POSSESSING A DANGEROUS WEAPON VIOLATES THE 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 
Possession of weapons for any lawful purpose is protected by the 1985 revision of Article 
I Section 6 of the Utah Constitution which reads: 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security 
and defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as 
for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein 
shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms. 
Jfiff i| fa n 'o/ 
The statute with which Mr. Willis is charged §76-10-503(2)(a) purports to penalize mere 
possession of weapons without any regard to the use or purpose of the weapon. It reads: 
(2) Any Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers, 
possesses, uses, or has under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony 
This issue was argued but not decided in State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, (Utah App. 
1991). (attached) The court, at 926, declined to reach the merits of a similar constitutional challenge 
as to parolees because the issue was not raised in the trial court. The appellate court held that failure 
of the trial court to have recognized the unconstitutionality of the statute was not plain error. The 
Court of Appeals found no plain error holding that the new amendment to Article I, §6 of the Utah 
Constitution did not obviously invalidate prior Utah authority approving restrictions of weapon 
possession. 
Although the Archambeau court was correct that such statutes had previously been approved, 
it incorrectly discounted the Legislative history of this amendment which is attached hereto and 
incorporated by reference.1 The debate regarding the amendment indicates that the amendment was 
1
 Reference to the legislative history (in Appendix 1) is not dispositive. It appears 
that when the amendment process began, the legislators desired to insure a state individual right 
to keep and bear arms (House floor debates on Senate Joint Resolution No. 2, 3/7/83 pages 1-3). 
It appears that the amendment was not studied by the Judiciary Interim Study Committee 
or by the Constitutional Study and Revision Commission (House floor debates on Senate Joint 
Resolution No. 2, 3/7/83 pages 4-5, 9-10; minutes of the Constitutional Revision Committee, 
5/25/84 page 2). 
The voter information pamphlet for November 6, 1984 indicates in the "Arguments For" 
section that "convicted felons, mental incompetents, minors, and illegal aliens would not be 
guaranteed" the right to keep and bear arms. Pamphlet page 28. In the "Rebuttal To" section, 
the author warns that the language of the amendment itself makes no mention of classes of 
people who are not protected by the amendment. Id. 
Additional history of the amendment is found in "The Individual Right to Bear Arms: An 
Illusory Public Pacifier?", 1986 Utah L.Rev. 751, 751-755 and accompanying notes. 
passed in an effect to "overrule" and nullify the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Vlacil, 
645 P.2 697, (Utah 1982) which held that the right to bear arms was a collective rather than an 
individual right and that the Legislature could regulate possession of weapons. 
II THE COURT SHOULD RELY ON THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION IN STRIKING THIS STATUTE DOWN AS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
While the Utah Constitution allows for legislation defining the lawful use of weapons, it 
flatly prohibits legislation infringing on the individual right to keep and bear arms for any lawful 
purpose. It states: 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security 
and defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as 
for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein 
shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 6 (1985 version in 1990 supp.). 
This Court must strike the statute purporting to penalize mere possession of dangerous 
weapons because it infringes the individual right to keep and bear arms and does not define a lawful 
(or unlawful) use of arms. 
Reference to basic tenets of federalism and Utah constitutional construction, establish that 
this argument is properly raised for this Court's adjudication. 
A. PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM CALL FOR A RULING UNDER THE STATE 
CONSTITUTION 
As is discussed more fully below, basic tenets of federalism call for this Court to enforce the 
Utah Constitution in answering this question of state law. 
The United States of America is a federation of state governments. The states preceded the 
federation and hold general, residual powers to govern, which are limited only by the state and 
federal constitutions In contrast, the federal government's powers are limited to those enumerated 
in the federal constitution See ej*_ Constitution of Utah States, Amendment X This federalist form 
of government is based on historical distrust, fear and confinement of centralized government, and 
historical trust and empowerment of local government to represent and serve the citizens of each 
state See e ^ Manning v Sevier County 517 P 2d 549, 553-554 (Utah 1973) Crockett, J 
concurring, joined by Ellett J , Hennod, J ) 
Federalist reliance on local government and limitation of centralized government is reflected 
m the differences between state and federal constitutions State constitutions are tailored to the 
regions they govern, they are detailed and specific, they are dynamic On the other hand, the federal 
constitution is uniform, general, and unchanging Compare the frequently amended Utah 
Constitution with the federal constitution See also Utah Code Ann Section 63-54-1 et seg (Utah 
Constitution Revision Study Commission created to study Utah Constitution, inform governor and 
legislature of needed changes) 
Federalism is a principle that is important m Utah The people of this state historically have 
cherished local government and fought to limit federal intrusion into questions of state law E g L J 
Arlington and D Bitton, The Mormon Experience, 161-184 Our state Supreme Court was perhaps 
the last state court to accept "incorporation" of provisions of the federal Bill of Rights See e g 
Manning v Sevier County, 517 P 2d549,553 fUtah!973¥Crockett J concurring, jointed by Ellett, 
J , Hennod, J ) (federal incorporation doctrine is disingenuous, violative of principles of federalism, 
first amendment to United States Constitution does not apply to state actors) 
The question raised m this case, whether individual citizens should be allowed to possess 
weapons, is a question of state law While the federal constitution does have a provision referring 
to a right to bear arms, that provision applies exclusively to federal government - not state 
government. E.g. State v. Vlacil 645 P.2d 677, 679 (Utah 1982). The federal provision refers to 
a collective right, which does not protect individuals. Id. The federal provision is interpreted 
narrowly as facilitating militias. Id. 
Utah, like many other states, has a state constitutional provision protecting the individual 
right to keep and bear arms. Constitution of Utah, Article I section 6 (1985, in 1990 Supp.).2 The 
language of the current constitutional provision relating to the individual right to keep and bear arms 
was passed by a strong majority of the Utah legislature after years of negotiation and revision. "The 
Individual Right to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?", 1986 Utah L.Rev. 751, 753-754 
nn. 13. (attached) The language of the current constitutional provision relating to the individual right 
to keep and bear arms was passed by a strong majority of the Utah voters. Id. At n.12. 
Basic principles of federalism call on this Court to recognize and follow this constitutional 
provision in deciding this case. 
B. PRINCIPLES OF UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION CALL FOR A 
RULING UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION. 
Mr. Willis' argument that the statute penalizing the mere possession of weapons violates the 
plain language of the Utah Constitution comports with the Utah Constitutional rule that the Utah 
Constitution is to be applied in accordance with its express terms. Article I section 26 of the Utah 
Constitution provides: 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, 
unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise. 
Article I section 26 (1953). 
2
 Reference to other state constitutional provisions and decisions is not helpful; Utah's 
provision is unique and apparently the broadest in the nation. See Appendix 2 (containing 
provisions from other state constitutions). 
The argument that the plain language of the Utah Constitution should be given effect is also 
consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, which is explicitly recognized in the Utah 
Constitution. Constitution of Utah, Article V section 1 (1953). Sutherland explains how judicial 
allegiance to the plain language enacted by the legislature is required by the doctrine of separation 
of powers: 
The preference for literalism in determining the effect of a 
statute is based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. 
The courts owe fidelity to the will of the legislature. What a 
legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence 
of the legislative intent or will. Therefore, the courts are bound to 
give effect to the expressed intent of the legislature. The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court 
has captured this idea in the following language: "It is an elementary 
proposition that courts only determine by construction the scope and 
intent of the law when the law itself is ambiguous or doubtful. If a 
law is plain and within the legislative power, it declares itself and 
nothing is left for interpretation. It is as binding upon the court as 
upon every citizen. To allow a court, in such a case, to say that the 
law must mean something different from the common import of its 
language, because the court may think that its penalties are unwise or 
harsh would make the judicial superior to the legislative branch of the 
government, and practically invest it with the lawmaking power. The 
remedy for a harsh law is not in interpretation but in amendment or 
repeal." 
Sutherland, Statutory Construction,§46.03 
While this Court may deem the constitutional amendment of Article I section 6 unwise, or 
even dangerous, judicial compensation is not the answer. If the legislature wants to penalize 
offenders for possessing weapons, the legislature needs to propose an amendment to the constitution 
and submit it to the electorate. 
If this Court were to save the statute penalizing mere possession of weapons by offenders by 
finding that, in defining lawful use of arms under Article I section 6, the legislature may proscribe 
mere possession, the constitutional right to keep and bear arms would be an empty shell for all of 
us. Article I section 26 of the Utah Constitution (requiring literal interpretation of Utah Constitution) 
and Article V section 1 of the Utah Constitution (requiring separation of judicial, legislative, and 
executive powers) require this Court to give effect to the plain language of Article I section 6(1985). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above argument and authorities Mr. Willis respectfully requests this Court to 
dismiss Count I, unlawful possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, on the ground 
that the statute violates his individual right to bear arms as guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. 
DATED this 2 day of October, 2000. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the Utah County Attorney's 
Office, 150 East Center, Provo, Utah 84601, this day of January, 2001. 
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UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WADE LEON WILLIS, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 001403071 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed January 4, 2001, and his 
accompanying memorandum in support thereof. The State filed an Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss, and the Defendant filed a Response. 
Defendant moves to dismiss Count I of this prosecution on the grounds that U.C.A. § 76-
10-503(2)(a) violates Defendant's right to keep and bear arms pursuant to Article I, Section 6 of 
the Utah Constitution. This provision of the Utah Constitution reads: 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and defense of 
self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall 
not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the 
lawful use of arms. 
The Defendant argues that a portion of the statute under which Defendant was charged is at odds 
with this provision of the Utah Constitution, and is therefore unconstitutional. Defendant was 
charged under U.C.A. § 76-10-503(2)(a), which reads: 
(2) Any Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has 
under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony. 
Defendant maintains that the Utah Constitution has granted the legislature the power to regulate 
the use of firearms, but not ihe possession of firearms. Defendant asserts that this statute is 
unconstitutional because it prohibits the mere possession of a firearm, the crime with which 
Defendant was charged in Count I. 
-1 -
The recent case of State v. la 2000 UT App. 358, addresses the constitutionality of 
U.C.A.§ 76-10-503(2)(a) in light of Article I, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution. The Appellate 
Court noted that "[w]hen addressing [constitutional challenges], this court presumes that the 
statute is valid, and [resolves] any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality." Id The court 
then concluded that the statute "does not unconstitutionally interfere with one's right to bear 
arms. This statute only restricts that right under very limited circumstances—such as a felony 
indictment or conviction. Such restrictions are constitutional." Id (citations omitted). The court 
further cited State v. Beorchia. 530 P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1974), as holding that this statute is a 
proper exercise of State police powers. 
In light of this recent appellate decision, the Court holds that the restrictions contained in 
U.C.A.§ 76-10-503(2)(a), including the restriction of mere possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person, do not unconstitutionally interfere with one's right to bear arms because the statute only 
restricts that right under very limited circumstances. Defendant's Motion is Dismiss is therefore 
denied. 
DATED this &- day of. . 2001. 
BY THE COURT 
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OPfNION 
Copr © West 2002 No Claim to Ong U S Govt Works 
LV1KS0N, Presiding Judge: 
11 1 Defendant appeals his conviction 
subsequent to a conditional guilty plea to 
possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person, a second-degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. $ 
76-10-503f2X») ($TO,2001) (Weapons 
Restrictions Statute). [FN 1 ] We affirm. 
FN1, This section provides, in 
pertinent part, "[a] Category I 
restricted person who purchases, 
transfers, possesses, uses, or has 
under his custody or control: (a) 
any firearm is guilty of a second 
degree felony." Utah Code Ann. $ 
7fH0-S03qXt) (STOqOOlV 
[lj[2] H 2 Defendant challenges the statute 
under which he was convicted as being 
unconstitutional on its face. " 'A 
constitutional challenge to a statute 
presents a question of law, which we 
review for correctness.... When addressing 
such a challenge, *462 this court presumes 
that the statute is valid, and we resolve any 
reasonable doubts in favor of 
constitutionality.'" State v. Momson. 2001 
UT 73.K S. 31 PJd S47 (Utah 20011 
(alteration in original) (quoting State v. 
Lopes. 1909 UT 24* 6. 980 P.2d 191). 
ANALYSIS 
Ul 11 3 State v In. 2000 C T App 358, 18 
PJd 500. is controlling. In that case we 
stated that the Weapons Restrictions 
Statute 
does not unconstitutionally interfere with 
one's right to bear arms. This statute 
only restricts that right under very 
limited circumstances-such as a felony 
indictment or conviction. Such 
restrictions are constitutional. See Utah 
Const art L § 6 ...;[ JFN21] State v 
*«ortto530P.2d813.815 (Utah 1974) 
(holding that this section is a proper 
exercise of State police powers). 
FN2. Utah Const, art. I $ 6 
provides: "The individual right of 
the people to keep and bear arms 
for security and defense of self, 
family, and others, property, or the 
state, as well as for other lawful 
purposes shall not be infringed; but 
nothing herein shall prevent the 
legislature from defining the lawful 
use of arms/1 
Id. at «f 14. Defendant attempts to 
distinguish the present case by arguing that 
In only addresses the constitutionality of 
the statute as it applies to use, as opposed 
to "mere possession of a firearm by a 
restricted person/' (Emphasis added.) 
However, our conclusion in In, a case in 
which the defendant was convicted of 
illegally possessing a firearm, simply 
stated that the restrictions contained in 
"this statute do[ ] not unconstitutionally 
interfere with one's right to bear arms," 
and made no distinction between use and 
possession. A/. Because //? made no 
distinction between use and possession, its 
Copr 0 West 2002 No Claim to Ong U S Govt Works 
conclusion that the Weapons Restrictions 
Statute is constitutional applies both to 
restrictions on possession and to 
restrictions on use. I FN3] 
FN3. Moreover, we note that one 
may "use" a firearm by the mere act 
of possessing it—e.g., to deter 
unlawful behavior in "defense of 
self, family, and others" etc. Utah 
Const art! § 6. By way of further 
illustration, we note that the United 
States, by mere possession of a 
nuclear arsenal, theoretically "uses" 
that arsenal to deter would-be 
aggressors from taking military 
action against it. We also note that 
Utah Const art L § 6 makes no 
distinction between passive use and 
active use of a firearm. 
f 4 Accordingly, we reject Defendant's 
constitutional challenge to the Weapons 
Restrictions Statute and affirm his 
conviction for possession of a firearm by a 
restricted person. 
t 5 Affirmed. 
H 6 We Concur: JAMES Z DAVIS and 
WILLIAM A, THORNE JR.. Judges. 
52 P.3d 461,451 Utah Adv. Rep. 12,2002 
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